Suchergebnisse

Dedication -- Acknowledgements -- List of Contributors -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Multiple Crises -- A Project in the Making -- The Project -- A Non-Positivist Hypothesis -- Note -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: The Geopolitical Economy of the Arab Revolutions -- Forces of Revolution -- US Empire? -- Or Geopolitical Economy? -- The Geopolitical Economy of the Arab Revolutions -- Oil and Imperialism in MENA Before the 1970s -- Declinism, 'Hegemony', and the Unhinging of US Middle East Policy -- From the Hubris of 'Empire'… -- …To the Fall -- Bibliography

Abstract
Any attempt to resolve political violence in religious or ethnic terms is bound to fail at the outset, for it settles for addressing a representation of the symptoms and manifestations of violence rather than disclosing its constitutive moments and the political terrain of its lived relevance. My argument runs counter to such a phenomenological presentation of violence, asserting that the contemporary violent conflicts within Iraq are not a war of sect against sect, but rather one among powerful political contenders and their regional and/or international backers. To generalize and present war in the first sense is to apologetically cover up what essentially is a class conflict, above all among fractions of the ruling class and their political representatives, an explanatory that creates an image of senseless violence. This class scenario cries for a security state, order and the monopolization of violence, i.e., the making of a hierarchical class-based state. The constitution, coherence and homogeneity of any ruling class is not pre-given, rather it necessitates a project of political hegemony within the power block in which it is established, reproduced and guaranteed by the state. The absence of such a hegemony witnesses conflicts among fractions of the ruling class that permeate all societal levels to the extent that the state apparatus itself becomes an instrument, mean and object of the conflicts rather than its purveyors and means of pacification. The intersection of imperialist occupation, violent claims for hegemony among regional contenders and domestic struggle over political power assumes inevitably fractured and particularist forms: religion, confession and ethnicity. In this way, religion, confession and ethnicity are not the cause of violence; rather the contest for hegemony violently manufacture and set them in motion. The destructive occupation regime and the lack of political will to make a unified national field empower sects and ethnicities to be recast as ideological centrifuges. In this article I will reconstruct the developments up to the emergence of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) in December 2013/January 2014, in order to decipher the present and to warn that such catastrophes are to be expected in the future unless radical changes and reforms are made to the whole state edifice imposed on Iraqis from 2003.

"Wie ich im Folgenden zeigen möchte: Die dominierende Kraft innerhalb des ägyptischen Staatsapparats war die neoliberale Technokratie. Deren technokratisches Wissen stellte eine ideologische Praxis dar, da sie die Produktionsverhältnisse und Machtfrage entpolitiserte: Entpolitisierung stellt die effektivste Politikform zur Verschleierung der (macht)politischen und sozialen Interessen und der daraus folgenden Durchsetzung von Umstrukturierungen dar. Das wird insbesondere in Krisensituationen deutlich." (Textauszug)

To understand the current revolutionary situation in the Arab Middle East, the conditions of existence of state power have to be taken into account, i.e., neoliberal restructuring, restructuring of classes, transformations in the ruling parties, the imperialist embedding of the state, the brutal disorganization of the subordinate classes, and the shifts of weight among the state apparatuses. These developments have created new contradictions and conflicts of interest which erupted due to the accumulation of resistance on the one hand, and on the other, due to international and regional shifts (the geostrategic weakness of the U.S. and its allies in the region, economic crisis), and due to political mistakes of state parties, alienation of parts of the ruling classes and state actors. In times of global and national crises, and in the absence of a democratic socialist organization of the popular classes in the Arab region, fractions of the ruling classes and certain forces of the state apparatus with the assistance of international forces help promote the initiative for change. They appeal to the popular classes, who long engaged in multiple forms of resistance, in the struggle of these fractions against other dominant fractions in the power bloc.

"To understand the current revolutionary situation in the Arab Middle East, the conditions of existence of state power have to be taken into account, i.e., neoliberal restructuring, restructuring of classes, transformations in the ruling parties, the imperialist embedding of the state, the brutal disorganization of the subordinate classes, and the shifts of weight among the state apparatuses. These developments have created new contradictions and conflicts of interest which erupted due to the accumulation of resistance on the one hand, and on the other, due to international and regional shifts (the geostrategic weakness of the U.S. and its allies in the region, economic crisis), and due to political mistakes of state parties, alienation of parts of the ruling classes and state actors. In times of global and national crises, and in the absence of a democratic socialist organization of the popular classes in the Arab region, fractions of the ruling classes and certain forces of the state apparatus with the assistance of international forces help promote the initiative for change. They appeal to the popular classes, who long engaged in multiple forms of resistance, in the struggle of these fractions against other dominantfractions in the power bloc." (author's abstract)

To understand the current revolutionary situation in the Arab Middle East, the conditions of existence of state power have to be taken into account, i.e., neoliberal restructuring, restructuring of classes, transformations in the ruling parties, the imperialist embedding of the state, the brutal disorganization of the subordinate classes, and the shifts of weight among the state apparatuses. These developments have created new contradictions and conflicts of interest which erupted due to the accumulation of resistance on the one hand, and on the other, due to international and regional shifts (the geostrategic weakness of the US. and its allies in the region, economic crisis), and due to political mistakes of state parties, alienation of parts of the ruling classes and state actors. In times of global and national crises, and in the absence of a democratic socialist organization of the popular classes in the Arab region, fractions of the ruling classes and certain forces of the state apparatus with the assistance of international forces help promote the initiative for change. They appeal to the popular classes, who long engaged in multiple forms of resistance, in the struggle of these fractions against other dominant fractions in the power bloc. Adapted from the source document.

The war in Iraq can neither be understood as a sectarian nor as a civil war, rather, it implicitly refers to internal struggles for power within the governing cliques and their opponents. The civil war artefact is presented by the occupier and the governing cliques in Iraq. The rational behind the construction is to further legitimize the occupation and the presence of an ever-increasing number of troops, on which the position of power of the governing cliques relies immensely. Rather than a civil war, what exists is a correlation of political power and economic interest between the Bush administration and the ruling cliques in Iraq in as much as both political agendas depend on the compliance of the other.

The war in Iraq can neither be understood as a sectarian nor as a civil war, rather, it implicitly refers to internal struggles for power within the governing cliques and their opponents. The civil war artefact is presented by the occupier and the governing cliques in Iraq. The rational behind the construction is to further legitimize the occupation and the presence of an ever-increasing number of troops, on which the position of power of the governing cliques relies immensely. Rather than a civil war, what exists is a correlation of political power and economic interest between the Bush administration and the ruling cliques in Iraq in as much as both political agendas depend on the compliance of the other. (Prokla / FUB)

The war in Iraq can neither be understood as a sectarian nor as a civil war, rather, it implicitly refers to internal struggles for power within the governing cliques & their opponents. The civil war artifact is presented by the occupier & the governing cliques in Iraq. The rationale behind the construction is to further legitimize the occupation & the presence of an ever-increasing number of troops, on which the position of power of the governing cliques relies immensely. Rather than a civil war, what exists is a correlation of political power & economic interest between the Bush administration & the ruling cliques in Iraq in as much as both political agendas depend on the compliance of the other. References. Adapted from the source document.